

10-2012


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Wells, Pamela; Combs, Julie P.; and Bustamante, Rebecca M. (2012) "TEACHER PROFESSIONALISM AND TEAM PERFORMANCE PAY: A MIXED METHODS STUDY," *Administrative Issues Journal*: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 13.

Available at: <https://dc.swosu.edu/aij/vol2/iss2/13>

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TEACHER PROFESSIONALISM AND TEAM PERFORMANCE PAY: A MIXED METHODS STUDY

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The purpose of this mixed methods research study was to explore teachers' perceptions of their professional behaviors when they worked in schools that awarded team performance pay. Teachers' archival responses from two questionnaires were analyzed using mixed methods data analysis techniques (Year 1, n = 368; Year 2, n = 649). Most teachers had positive views of the team performance pay system. Lack of collaboration has been a criticism of some individual performance pay systems; however, teachers in this study believed that the team performance pay encouraged collaboration and attendance at staff development. Findings were interpreted using the framework of collective teacher efficacy. Additional studies are needed to explore the potential impact of various performance pay systems on professional behaviors of teachers.

Keywords: performance pay, educational reform, professional behaviors, teachers

Many employees in business and industry have the opportunity to receive merit, bonuses, or performance pay based on the attainment of accomplishing specific criteria or goals (Kanter & Lucas, 2007; Lawler & Mohrman, 2003). Comparatively, few teachers receive performance pay and even fewer receive team performance awards. For example, in 2007-2008, only 14.8% of teachers worked in districts that provided performance pay (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). Yet many politicians and business leaders have called for more pay systems that reward teacher performance (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b).

Performance pay plans in the 1980s were based primarily on individual performance and were, for the most part, not successful because of teachers' perceptions of a lack of fairness (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). In order to combat these perceptions of a lack of fairness, collaborative or team performance pay programs have been developed. One type of team performance pay, school-based performance awards (SBPA), encourages teachers to work together to accomplish goals (Odden & Kelly, 2002). Collaborative or team performance pay programs have been developed in response to criticisms about individual performance systems (Odden & Kelly, 2002) which have focused on issues of fairness, motivation, and communication about the performance pay programs (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2002). Although teacher collaboration has been suggested as a potential benefit of team performance pay systems, empirical studies are needed to understand how teachers perceive the impact of performance pay on their professional behaviors, particularly team performance pay systems.

Because many business and political leaders, as well as education reformers, have encouraged implementation of performance pay programs (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b), research is needed to inform program implementation. For this reason, some scholars (Lavy, 2002) have stressed the importance of conducting research related to educator performance pay, in that "before the introduction of school incentives becomes the next revolution in schools, much more concrete evidence is needed about the optimal incentive structure in schools and their effect and cost" (p. 1287). Additionally, performance pay programs have potential implementation challenges and financial costs that call for research-driven information that supports decision-making related to school performance pay program design. Moreover, findings from studies focused on team performance pay systems can be used by business leaders,

legislators, and policy makers to understand the impact that performance pay has on teacher professional practices.

The purpose of this mixed methods research study was to explore teachers' perceptions of their professional behaviors when they worked in schools that awarded team performance pay. Archival data (both quantitative and qualitative) were analyzed from 2 academic years. These questionnaires were completed by 368 teachers during Year 1 of implementation and by 649 teachers during Year 2 who were eligible to receive team performance pay. In particular, responses to specific questionnaire items that elicited teachers' perceptions of their professional behaviors in team performance pay systems were examined.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: TEAM PERFORMANCE PAY

A review of the literature indicated that there is a continuing debate over the efficacy of using performance pay in schools. Although some studies have examined the relationship of performance pay to teacher retention and student achievement, few studies were found that examined the issues of teachers' professional behaviors related to team performance pay.

Those who argue against performance pay for teachers point to its potential to impede teacher collaboration (Heyburn, Lewis, & Ritter, 2010). According to Lavy (2007), potential drawbacks or problems associated with performance pay and collaboration include the following: (a) measurement problems (i.e., agreement about goals as well as fair and accurate evaluations), (b) negative effects on collegiality, (c) unintended consequences (i.e., focus only on measurable dimensions or selected students and *game play* [cheating]), (d) increased costs, (e) union opposition, and (f) past failures of performance pay systems. Because of these concerns, some researchers have emphasized the possible benefits of group or team incentive pay structures, rather than individual performance pay, and argue that group performance pay can mitigate some of the issues of fairness. However, others have identified several drawbacks associated with team performance pay. Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002) posited that "team based incentives may lead to free riders" (p. 916). Lavy (2007) identified this *free riding* as a potential problem, especially if a teacher's reward share is small relative to the effort that must be expended. According to Lavy (2007), encouraging peer pressure and mutual monitoring can reduce the problem of free riding in a team performance pay program.

Other researchers have focused on the relative merits of team performance pay. Whole school or departmental team rewards encouraged goal focus and collaboration (Raham, 2000). According to Mohrman, Mohrman, and Odden (1996), group performance pay could be a more successful design when compared to individual rewards. Researchers have noted that additional research is necessary to study the impact of group performance pay programs (Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009; Podgursky & Springer, 2007a; Springer, Ballou et al., 2010; Springer & Gardner, 2010).

When considering how teacher behavior might change related to performance pay, Lavy (2007) posited that teacher performance pay could cause teachers to work harder to improve performance. One of the ways that teachers improve performance is through professional development and collaboration. These teacher behaviors are two areas of focus of this team performance pay research. For teacher effort to increase through motivation, Kelley (1999) suggested that teachers must understand the goals, believe they can accomplish them, and must see the potential rewards as valuable.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework used in this study about team performance pay and teachers' professional behaviors was collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000). Collective teacher efficacy involves the "perceptions of teachers in a school that the efforts of the faculty as a whole will have a positive effect on students" (Goddard, Hoy, & Hoy, 2000, p. 480) and is based on the earlier work of Bandura's social cognitive theory. Of particular concern in this study were teachers' perceptions of their professional behaviors in light of the possibility of receiving a team performance bonus based on the achievement of their students. The school district described in the context of the study provided a rich environment to examine perceived behaviors of teachers in specific areas of collaboration, staff development, and support. Contextual conditions that provided a rich environment for this study were that these teachers had the opportunity to earn team incentives and they worked with challenging student populations in identified at-risk schools.



METHOD

Mixed methods were used to address the research questions presented in this study. Mixed methods are based on a philosophically pragmatic paradigm, a paradigm that best addresses policy-driven topics such as teacher merit pay (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Specifically, a 13-step mixed methods research model developed by Collins, Onwuegbuzie, and Sutton (2006) was used to guide the methodological process in this study. Overall, the 13-step mixed method approach involves a series of steps within stages comprised of *formulation* (Steps 1-5), *planning* (Steps 6, 7), *implementation* (Steps 8-11), and *writing* (Steps 12, 13). Essentially, at each stage in the model, the researcher must take steps to identify the purpose for mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches, as well as explicate exactly how mixing will occur throughout the research process from sampling to data analysis, validation, and interpretation (see Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Sutton, 2006). This 13-step model was used as a guide in this study because the extensive archival survey data included both quantitative and qualitative data as a primary data source and the researchers wanted to ensure data were given equal weight throughout the research process.

Context of the Study

The school district in this study was located in an urban/suburban area and had a student enrollment of 106,000 students. It was the third largest school district in a state located in the southeastern United States. Because of its neighborhood concept of school placement, the district had great disparity in student demographics, teacher retention, and teacher experience levels among its various schools (The Education Trust, 2008). The school district participated for 3 years in a grant program called the District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE). The DATE was funded by a state legislature designed to provide performance pay for teachers based on student performance gains. The objectives of the DATE program included an increase in students' performance and teacher retention on at-risk campuses in the district. Secondly, school district administrators hoped that the team structure of the award would motivate teachers to collaborate to improve student performance. The teachers who responded to this survey were eligible for varying amounts of reward based on the courses and grade levels they taught. Those teachers who taught a course and grade level that was tested in the state accountability examination could earn a reward of between \$3,500 and \$5,500. Those teachers who did not teach a state-tested content and grade level were eligible for awards between \$750 and \$1,000.

Selection of Participants

Archival survey data were taken from a nested sample of a larger data set collected by the National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University. The data used in this study included responses from all teachers in one school district that implemented performance pay for two academic years, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. All teachers surveyed worked in schools that were Title I campuses with high percentages of students living in poverty. For 2008-2009, data from teachers at 13 elementary schools and six middle schools were used. For 2009-2010, teacher response data were used from 14 elementary schools and seven middle schools. Only the responses from teachers were used in our study and included 368 teachers for 2008-2009 and 649 teachers for 2009-2010. Some of the same teachers participated in the data collection from both years; however, we were not given permission to identify participants in order to compare individual responses.

Instruments

The two questionnaires used in the study originally were developed by research staff at the National Center on Performance Incentives to measure educators' attitudes about the DATE or team performance pay program, the school environment, and teachers' professional practices (Springer, Lewis, Ehlert et al., 2010). The instruments were administered online to all full time instructional staff members at all of the team performance pay program schools. The questionnaire had 55 items in the spring 2009 administration and 63 items in the spring 2010 administration. These items were divided into the following sections: (a) professional title, (b) attitudes about the program, (c) school environment, (d) curriculum and instruction practices, (e) background information, and (f) teacher compensation information. The attitudinal questions related to the DATE program and the school environments were designed with four structured-anchored response choices. Questions related to curriculum and instruction were focused on time and frequency response choices. Nine of the questions contained demographic data. Additionally, there were open-

ended responses on the two archival instruments that provided qualitative data; in this study these data were compared with the quantitative data.

Data Analysis

The archival data were analyzed using a mixed methods data analysis approach. Specifically, findings were integrated from both quantitative data analysis and qualitative analysis techniques (Onwuegbuzie & Combs, 2010) that involved descriptive statistics, a constant comparative approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to analyze narrative responses, and the use of a matrix to identify similarities and differences across data. Descriptive statistics, including frequencies, were used to analyze closed-item responses. All open-ended responses were reviewed and coded by three different researchers, with particular attention to comments that reflected the notion of collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000). Codes were tallied to generate several themes that captured teachers' perceptions of their professional behaviors as they related to the participation in the team performance pay system. After collapsing and re-categorizing themes and checking for unusual cases, findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses then were combined on a matrix to identify the most prominent emergent themes related to teachers' professional behaviors. In comparing quantitative and qualitative findings, four primary themes emerged, all of which reflected teachers' favorable views of the performance pay system.

FINDINGS

The findings of this research indicated that most teachers had positive perceptions of the DATE team performance pay program. Overall, teachers' perceptions, as interpreted from qualitative and quantitative data, reflected their beliefs that the program (a) was worthwhile and generally accepted and supported by teachers, (b) helped them to improve their teaching practices in ways that might have improved student learning, (c) contributed to high quality professional development, and (d) positively impacted collaboration and collegiality.

General Acceptance and Support by Teachers

A key component of professionalism related to the general acceptance and support for the DATE program. The quantitative and qualitative findings suggested strong support from teachers for implementation, with 90.9% in Year 1 and 90.6% in Year 2 agreeing with the statement, "I am glad that the school is participating in the DATE program this 2008-2009 school year." Agreement was 70.4% to the item, "The DATE incentive plan at my school is helping to increase student learning" in the first year of implementation and 73.7% in the second year of implementation. A strong majority in Year 1 (72.6%) agreed with the statement, "The DATE incentive plan is helping to improve teaching practices at my school." Likewise, in Year 2 of implementation, 71.6% agreed with the same statement.

Qualitative results were also positive. In Year 1, a teacher stated, "I appreciate being recognized for doing a great job with my kiddos. THANKS." Supportive comments were stated in a variety of ways, including "Love the DATE program and hope it continues!" An additional teacher expressed that the program was a "good incentive for teachers." A teacher entreated, "Please keep this program at our school." Yet another teacher expressed, "This has been a wonderful opportunity to participate in DATE Grant." One enthusiastic teacher wrote, "Yea for DATE grant!!! Any extra money is very much appreciated." Another teacher expressed the same sentiment:

I do not feel the DATE grant changed me as a teacher because I am there for the kids not the money. With that being said, I do appreciate the money being given to the teachers of hard to fill positions in schools that are hard to keep staff. We work extremely hard on a daily basis to get our students to perform at a level of students who do not have to deal with the issues outside of school that our students do. It is nice to be compensated for the difficult job we do every day.

A few comments expressed an anticipation that some of their colleagues might respond negatively to the program because those teachers did not teach a course and grade level that could receive a maximum reward. The following teacher's comment was reflective of that position:

I think this is a good program. I feel that some teachers are resentful, but they do not even attempt to teach the subjects that will get them the incentives. I feel that I always do a good job, but it is nice to get monetary



recognition for our efforts with the students.

Support for the idea that teachers on at-risk campuses would be provided this benefit was reflected in the following statement:

I like the idea of rewarding teachers in a school that deals with a difficult group of students. We deal with daily issues that many other teachers in other schools don't so it is great that we are trying to keep highly qualified teachers on our campus.

Improvement of Teaching Practices

The DATE program teachers generally indicated that participation in the program helped them improve their teaching practice because they felt motivated to do so. This was particularly evident in data collected during the second year of program implementation when teachers appeared to express greater overall support for the program and recognition that the DATE program provided incentives for teachers.

Several teachers indicated that they were working harder as a result of the DATE program. One teacher explained, "I believe the DATE program has helped increase the teachers [sic] performance and has increased student learning. TAKS-tested grades have truly kicked up their teaching practices." Another teacher wrote a similar comment, "I think this program encouraged me to be a better teacher because there was something in it for me. It rewarded hard work."

There were several comments specifically describing the motivational aspects of the DATE program. One teacher expressed, "The program motivates me to be a better teacher and professional." Another teacher noted, "The DATE program is a motivating incentive for educators." Although some teachers seemed hesitant to admit that the program's reward was motivating, they still expressed support for the program. One teacher explained:

I feel that I have been working hard along with my students on their progress and would have been even if there wasn't a DATE grant. However, I do see other people putting more effort and helping others to help in motivating students [sic] performance. Its [sic] nice to be rewarded for our hard work.

Another teacher expressed, "I feel that the DATE grant program is great. This really motivates all the staff in the school to get all students to perform at a higher level. This program has really united all of us."

These narrative comments by teachers support the quantitative results indicating that teachers believed that the program motivated them to improve their teaching skills and strategies. In the first year of implementation, a majority (52.3%) expressed agreement with the statement, "I will change my professional practices to try and earn a DATE bonus award." In the second year, the results were slightly higher, with 55.4% expressing agreement with the same statement. For the 2008-2009 survey, a strong majority (72.6%) supported the statement, "The DATE incentive plan is helping to improve teaching practices at my school." In the second year of implementation, agreement with that statement was less, but still reflected a strong majority, with 68.6% expressing agreement that the DATE program was improving teaching practices. Both quantitative and qualitative results reflected strong support for the belief that the DATE program improved teaching practices in these at-risk schools.

Quality of Professional Development

Staff development is an important function of professionalism for educators. In both Years 1 and 2, for the category of staff development, the qualitative and quantitative data were positive. For the question, "The DATE incentive plan at my school is contributing to improvements in the quality of professional development offered to teachers," 68.2% expressed agreement in 2009 and 64.9% in 2010. When asked to compare the amount of time spent on professional development activities compared to the prior school year, almost one half (48.8%) responded they spent more time "attending district-or school-sponsored professional development workshops." A similar percentage (48.6%) of teachers responded that they were spending more time on staff development activities than last year by "engaging in informal self-directed learning" (e.g., reading subject-specific education research, using the Internet to enrich knowledge and skills).

When analyzing the open-ended statements, there were multiple comments coded into the category of staff development. Teacher comments reflected substantial support for both the learning and the pay associated with the staff

development component of the DATE program. One teacher articulated it this way:

I have had the opportunity to attend many workshops that have provided such wonderful information this year. This is my first year to teach special education and these classes have proven to be what I needed to gain new information. I have 18 years experience in the classroom and feel like this year has been the most fulfilling for me because of the great learning opportunities that the DATE grant has provided.

Another teacher shared, "I have seen an increase in staff development attendance due to the DATE grant." A similar perception was expressed in this response, "I have been very pleased with the professional development opportunities with the DATE Grant. I feel that I have learned good information to use to impact my students." Yet another teacher commented on the collaborative nature of the staff development by saying, "I liked how the DATE grant staff development brought schools of like demographics together so that discussions were relevant for our students."

However, the qualitative data also revealed some negative perspectives about the staff development associated with the DATE program, especially the number and timing of workshop offerings. One teacher said, "The on-campus DATE classes have been infrequent and unorganized. They are held on days when teachers need to hold tutorials. The classes are not helpful." Another teacher related, "Much more professional development should be offered for math instruction to teachers who need to reach struggling students." One teacher shared a similar perspective, saying, "I feel there was only one chance offered for certain workshops. Sometimes there was a conflict I could not change. I missed out on the training." A concern was also expressed about how teachers received credit and compensation for attending training:

Something needs to be changed about how credit is given for the online course work. Many teachers...did not get credit for doing the work. It was very discouraging to have put forth the time and effort and not receive credit for it.

Although there was some criticism of the staff development offerings associated with the DATE program, the majority of the open-ended teacher comments were positive and indicated perceptions of improvements in professional development offerings as a result of the program.

Positive Impact on Collaboration and Collegiality

Results from this research indicated that DATE team performance pay program participants believed that the program fostered collegiality and cooperation among teachers. The collaboration category was important for this research because this DATE grant was designed intentionally as a team performance pay program. Additionally, some researchers have identified team performance pay as a method of reducing some of the concerns about collegiality and cooperation related to performance pay (Lavy, 2007).

Quantitative data reflected a strong perception by teachers of increased collaboration the first year of implementation, especially when asked to compare perceptions to the previous year. For the first year, there were several items on the teacher survey that related to collaboration. When asked to identify how important each factor was in determining a teacher's eligibility for a DATE bonus award, collaboration with faculty and staff was the third most important (57.8%) after improvements in test scores (69.3%) and teaching in hard-to-staff schools (58.4%). Only 23.9% agreed with the statement "The DATE incentive plan is causing resentment among teachers at my school." When asked the question in a different manner, a similar response was given by teachers. There were 77.6% of the teachers who disagreed with the statement that "The DATE incentive plan is having a negative impact on the school culture and professional collegiality in my school."

Additional questions related to a comparison from the first year of implementation (2008-2009) to the school year prior to implementation (2007-2008) had similar strong results. When asked if teachers "seem more competitive than cooperative," 84.4% disagreed. Likewise, 87.3% disagreed with the statement that teachers "trust each other less." A substantial majority, or 73.9%, said that compared to last school year, teachers "feel more responsible to help each other do their best." Similarly, 65.7% indicated that compared to the last school year, teachers "can be counted on more often to help out anywhere or anytime, even though it may not be part of their official assignment." When asked to compare specifically how they had changed their own teaching practices in the first year of implementation (i.e., 2008-2009) compared to the last school year (i.e., 2007-2008), 49% identified they had spent more time "reviewing



student test results with other teachers,” and a slight majority (53.8%) said that they were “seeking help from/providing help to other teachers informally” more than they had the previous year.

Although few open-ended responses related to the category of collaboration in the first year, those comments that were analyzed were all positive about the effects of the DATE program. One teacher responded, “I learned from the online module discussions [and] questions and got ideas from other teacher responses.” Another teacher mentioned the importance of teachers understanding the impact that collaboration would have on receiving a reward by saying, “They [administration] need to emphasize that this is an incentive for us all to work together to improve student performance (especially in TAKS-tested areas), so if they can help us out, it will benefit them financially.” One teacher explained how the DATE program encouraged collaboration through interdisciplinary and cross-content instruction:

The DATE program allowed us to integrate more subject areas. As teams we were able to meet and discuss what each subject was doing and help each other reinforce concepts taught in the subjects. It helped us to come together and help us teach our students that subjects intersect. At first the students didn’t understand why were [sic] were discussing science in a reading class or world culture events, and now they see how all the subjects interconnect with each other.

Another teacher described the benefits of working collaboratively in evaluating data:

It has been a learning experience especially when our team did the data dig. Coming together and seeing the areas that students were strong and weak.... Also, we tried focusing more on those weak areas when we taught and the test questions we asked.

For the second year of the survey (2010), quantitative and qualitative data continued to reflect support for the impact the team performance pay program had on collaboration and collegiality. When considering the quantitative survey data, there was a slight increase in positive responses to the question, “The DATE incentive plan is causing resentment among teachers at my school.” There was a 33.8% agreement, which was an increase of 10.2% from the prior year. These data still reflected that the majority did not believe the DATE program was causing resentment. Teachers disagreed strongly (81.1%) that teachers “seem more competitive than cooperative.” Similarly, 86.2% disagreed with the statement that teachers “trust each other less.” Another strong majority of teachers (76.5%) responded that they “feel more responsible to help each other do their best.” When asked, “Can teachers be counted on more often to help out anywhere or anytime, even though it may not be part of their official assignment?” 70.1% agreed. When asked to identify how they had changed their teaching practices this year (2009-2010) from the last year (2008-2009), one half of the teachers (50.8%) indicated they were more often “seeking help from/providing help to other teachers informally.” Based on the numerous quantitative responses, the teachers perceived that the DATE team performance pay program was related to increased collegiality.

Additionally, there were several open-ended comments related to collaboration on the spring 2010 survey. One teacher expressed, “I feel that the DATE grant program is great. This really motivates all the staff in the school to get all students to perform at a higher level. This program has really united all of us.”

In the second year, some teacher respondents expressed a preference for individual rewards rather than a group reward. As one teacher expressed,

Our DATE program was based solely on the team. However, my individual performance for both my classes far surpasses others and yet I never get any money. I cannot control the interest, and commitment of others, only myself. I have consistently reached my goals, but because my team does not, there is no monetary [sic] gain for me. Although I am not in it for the monetary [sic] gain, it is frustrating to see others get it.... Like a chain, the team is only as strong as its weakest link. We as teachers are not the ones who hire others, nor can we impose and instill our values and beliefs on others who have no desire to change.

Another teacher concurred with this comment:

It would be better to evaluate eligibility for awards based on individual teacher performance rather than as a grade level. Last year we had a teacher who was moving schools so she made no secret of not caring and not trying for the award. The rest of the team had to pull her scores up as well as raise ours to much higher levels.

In conclusion, the preponderance of quantitative and qualitative responses from teachers to questions related to collaboration for both years of the survey indicated that teachers perceived the DATE team performance pay program was related to increased collegiality.

DISCUSSION

Some researchers have reported the potential for negative effects on teacher professional behaviors, collegiality, and teacher collaboration as a result of performance pay programs (e.g., Adams, Heywood, & Rothstein, 2009; Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2009). However, the results of our study reflected a positive perception of teacher behaviors and teacher collegiality by the teachers surveyed. The qualitative responses further suggested that the team design of this performance pay program could have been a factor in these positive results.

Additionally, the results of this study have implications for the development and implementation of other performance incentive programs as they relate to teacher professionalism. Based on the findings discussed in the previous section, performance incentive programs such as DATE might motivate teachers to improve their teaching; however, teacher motivation has been found to be influenced by numerous other factors that do not necessarily involve financial incentives (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2002).

In this study, there was evidence that professional development quality and opportunities were enhanced as a result of the existence of the DATE program. Typically, performance incentive programs provide stipulations for professional development that goes beyond the staff in-service opportunities typically offered to teachers. Additionally, funds provided by the program can make professional development more viable. In considering implementation of future performance programs, district leaders should more closely consider the needs of individual school sites, as well as design effective ways for teachers to obtain credit and recognition for completing professional development. In particular, in this study some teachers expressed concern about obtaining credit for staff development offered on-line. On-line professional development requires careful planning and design to address both technological and content challenges.

The increased collaboration and cooperation among teachers in the DATE program was a surprising, yet important finding in this study. Although teacher retention was the primary goal of the DATE program, collaboration emerged as a key outcome reported by teacher respondents. Literature on professional learning communities and teacher collaboration suggests that teacher collaboration can positively impact student achievement (Goddard, Goddard, & Tschannen-Moran, 2007; McLaughlin, 2006) because teachers' skills and ideas are shared and, therefore, enhanced for the betterment of students. Teacher collegiality, engagement, and learning are also enhanced in the collaborative process (McLaughlin, 2006). Based on the findings of this study, districts that decide to implement teacher incentive programs should focus on team models rather than individual models.

CONCLUSION

Our research indicated a positive teacher perception of the team performance pay program. Teachers reported in both the quantitative and qualitative data that they supported the program and believed it was related to increased student learning at their schools. The data reflected that the program helped to improve the quality and participation in staff development. Additionally, a strong majority of the teachers indicated the team performance pay program resulted in enhanced teacher collaboration and collegiality.

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