Hrossa, Pigs, and Teddy Bears: The Animal Kingdom According to C.S. Lewis

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Abstract
Guest of Honor Address at Mythcon in 1996. “Lewis in relation to animals and the ethical questions they present.”

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HROSSA, PIGS, AND TEDDY BEARS

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Guest of Honor Address at the 1996 Mythopoeic Conference

Doris T. Myers

First I want to applaud the choice of this year's theme, "The Inkings and Nature." It is very fitting that a Mythopoeic Conference held in Colorado should have this theme, because here we live in a precarious relationship to nature. Just to give you one example, water is so scarce and so precious here that a whole branch of our judicial system is dedicated to hearing disputes over it. I know water is also an issue for you Californians; and as our population grows here in Colorado, we worry that it will become an even greater problem. In contrast, there is plenty of water — sometimes too much — in Great Britain. For example, on their 1937 walking tour C. S. Lewis and his brother were walking in a driving rain when they came upon "the odd spectacle of a stream spouting water through holes in the bank." Jack remarked that England needed to be worked on by a good plumber. (W. H. Lewis, 255). In my opinion, it still does.

The original draft of this address had a couple more pages of genial, semi-witty (I hope, not half-witty) talk comparing the Inkings' weather to ours. Then I realized that I had to limit my scope. So I'll focus on Lewis, and instead of talking about Nature in general, I'll look at Lewis in relation to animals and the ethical questions they present. In addition to Lewis' published works, I have consulted Warren Lewis' original collection of Jack's letters, called C. S. Lewis: A Biography. (Incidentally, it's high time this book was published as Warnie produced it. The present Letters of C. S. Lewis, even in the expanded edition, omits much interesting material.) What I have found is that Jack Lewis thought a great deal about the relationship between humans and animals, and it is illuminating for us to examine his struggles. Like most of us, he was not completely logical in his conclusions.

Like Lewis, I began my scholarly career with a specialization in medieval and renaissance literature. My dissertation topic was the rhetoric of the fourteenth century sermon. Therefore my discourse this morning, like a good medieval sermon, has three points, dealing with three attitudes toward the animal kingdom. Under the rubric of hrossa I will discuss what animals mean to us as pets. The second section, entitled pigs, deals with our use of animals — as food and for experimental purposes. Finally, under the heading "teddy bears" I discuss the use and misuse of animals as symbols. Incidentally, like many medieval sermons, my talk has a rather elaborate, tacked-on conclusio. So when we finish the three points, don't think you're home free. Our relationship to animals as pets comes up in the first novel of the planetary trilogy. On Malacandra, a planet where there are no pets, Ransom learns why we earthlings keep pets. When the strangeness of the hross repels him, Ransom corrects it by thinking of how the alien creature resembles the best sort of pet. Hyoi has a "glossy coat, liquid eye, sweet breath and whitest teeth." Being able to converse with him is like a return to Eden, of living "as though Paradise had never been lost and earliest dreams were true" (Silent Planet 58). In the last chapter, called "Postscript," Ransom speaks of the "instinct starved in us, which we try to soothe by treating irrational creatures almost as if they were rational" (156). He now realizes that the Malacandrians satisfy this instinct by having three rational species, by treating each other both as fellow knau (rational beings) and as pets. They don't need pets as we do because they have each other. An old sorn expresses pity for this human lack. He says, "Your thought must be at the mercy of your blood. For you cannot compare it with thought that floats on a different blood" (103).

Ransom's phrase "return to Eden" reveals that our need for pets is one manifestation of Sehnsucht, the romantic longing for something different, something beyond ourselves, which was such an important part of Lewis's spiritual journey. I think it is best described by Shelley:

"The desire of the moth for the star,
Of the night for the morrow;
The longing for something afar
From the sphere of our sorrow." 

In a 1947 letter to Ruth Pitter, Lewis implies that the romantic longing is not for fantasy animals like the hrossa of Malacandra or the fish-steeds of Perelandra, but just for something beyond our own ordinary existence. He says, "If you went to Perelandra you would 'feel the same nostalgia,'" and he adds, "the rabbit in Magdalen grove may mediate [the longing] as well as a hross" (Wade Coll. 4 Jan. 1947).

The great strength of this longing for pets is shown in a 1996 National Public Radio report from Sarajevo. The reporter found that many people kept pets in spite of the destruction around them. They braved snipers' bullets to walk their dogs, and one young man had spent the equivalent of a month's salary to buy medicine for his puppy on the black market. Lewis would have understood their motives.
In his view, however, there's more to this need than *Sehnsucht*. For Lewis, man's relationship to animals is set forth in the medieval-renaissance image of the great Chain of Being. It is a hierarchy in which all existences have a place. The lowest existence is that of inorganic matter. Then come plants, then animals, then man, then angels, etc. This view of the universe puts human beings between the beasts and the angels, as mediators — priests and kings — between the animals and a higher reality. Thus at the conclusion of *Perelandra* Ransom sees Tor and Tindril as "the resolution of discords," the bridge between "the warm multitude" of the animals and "the transcorporeal intelligences" of the eldils (207).

In Lewis's view, humankind's place in the Chain of Being entails a duty to raise animal nature to something higher. On Perelandra, the second Eden, Tor and Tindril are directed to "Give names to all creatures, guide all natures to perfection" (206). And early in the book Ransom finds Tindril treating the animals of her world as pets but also as more than pets, for she is their queen. "There was in her face an authority, in her caresses a condescension, which . . . raised them from the status of pets to that of slaves." She explains, "We make them older every day. Is not that what it means to be a beast?" (65). For Lewis this notion was more than a convenient fictional ornament to dress up an alien world. In *The Problem of Pain* he comments on how, in real life, his dog and cat are at peace with each other because they live in his household, under his rule (136). Lewis says that just as we become more fully ourselves because God intervenes in our human nature, animals become more fully themselves when humans take them into their homes and lives. And he writes to an Episcopal nun in New Jersey, who apparently had told him about the convent pet, that all dogs are, in a sense, leading conventual lives because they are living above their canine nature. (W. H. Lewis, 414).

Lewis' view of human domination of animals for their own good presents problems if we try to apply it too narrowly. When the question "What about wild animals?" is raised, Lewis says, somewhat lamely, that Christian revelation answers only practical questions about our salvation, not everything we might wish to know about the universe (*The Problem of Pain* 137). But the concept of humanity as priest\ king of the animals does emphasize the obligation to do what is best for the animal instead of thinking only of ourselves. In *The Four Loves* Lewis expresses great scorn for people who spoil their dogs out of a "terrible need to be needed" (78). He says, "If you need to be needed and if your family, very properly, decline to need you, a pet is the obvious substitute. . . . [I]t acts as a sump or drain — you are too busy spoiling a dog's life to spoil theirs" (79).

In other words, we have no right to misuse a pet to fulfill a psychological need. Despite Lewis' arguable, perhaps badly stated, view on how we should elevate animal nature, I think his understanding of our longing toward animals and our need for pets is remarkable.

Now let us turn to animals as pigs — the question of whether, and in what circumstances, we are justified in using animals to fulfill our physical needs. Peter Milward, in *A Challenge to C. S. Lewis*, accuses Lewis of an indifference to the suffering of animals derived from Descartes' theory that they have no selves, no real feeling of pain. His "challenge" to Lewis says, "it seems to me only reasonable to admit that there is in animals a varying degree of both consciousness and the right to life and dignity. It seems to me no less reasonable to reject . . . the killing and eating of animals . . ." (28-29). In *The Problem of Pain* Lewis distinguishes between sentience and [self]-consciousness, denying the latter to animals (131-33), but he also says we have a "strong conviction . . . of a real, though doubtless rudimentary, selfhood in the higher animals" (138). If one reads *That Hideous Strength* with due attention to the contrast between St. Anne's and Belbury, it becomes obvious that Lewis was not a Cartesian, despite his failure to follow Milward into vegetarianism.

His attitudes toward animals as pigs, however, is complex; it is inconsistent, not governed by the formal logic he valued so highly. He condones the eating of meat but disapproves of vivisection, even though it seems that the same logical argument could be made against both. Vegetarianism reigns in both Malacandra and Perelandra, both unfallen. In Malacandra, the *hrossa* ate vegetables and some fish, and the soms herded some sort of mammal and made cheese of its milk, but apparently did not use it as meat. Perelandra, the second Eden, is like Milton's description of the first Eden in *Paradise Lost*. According to Milton nobody, human or animal, is carnivorous until Adam and Eve eat the fatal fruit. Our foreparents begin to understand that their sin has changed Nature when they see an eagle chasing a pair of songbirds and the lion a pair of deer (xi.185-90). So Ransom, after living in Perelandra for more than a year, has become accustomed to a meatless diet. For his first meal on Earth he refuses bacon and eggs: "No fruit . . . ? Oh well, no matter. Bread or porridge or something" (31). Lewis is not promoting vegetarianism, however; he is merely following the biblical tradition which depicts peace among the animals as a sign of the kingdom of God.

In *That Hideous Strength*, Lewis depicts Mr. Bultitude the bear and the Director's mice as pets — animals at peace with man (and there is something convent-like about St. Anne's). Nevertheless, the Christmas dinner that concludes the book, an emblem of the peace that Venus and the other elders have brought about, features a traditional goose (364). At one point MacPhee complains of "an essential falsity in the whole system of [St. Anne's]," where the bear "is kept in the house and pampered" while "the pigs are kept in a sty and killed for bacon." He adds, "I would be interested to know the philosophical rationale of the distinction." Ivy replies, "I think it's just silly. Who ever heard of trying to make bacon out of a bear?" (262-63).
In a way, Ivy’s no-nonsense, working-class dismissal of the question is justified. The decision that certain animals are edible and others are not is based on culture and custom rather than rational considerations such as the animal’s intelligence and personality, for pigs are surely more intelligent than bears. In the hill country of Arkansas where I was born, my grandmother’s generation did eat bear. In my time rats were not considered edible, but squirrels — also rodents — were fried like chicken. In South America I once ate alligator and piranha, and I suspected that what was offered to us as beef was, in reality, often horsemeat. The nationals ate monkey and some slugs; I was never offered any, but I think I would have declined.

From what I am able to gather, Lewis ate without scruple all the animals that his British culture considered edible, and that is what he portrays in the Chronicles of Narnia. In The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, the children — and the Beavers — eat ham (106). In Prince Caspian they are hungry enough to eat bear, although Lewis explains carefully that it is not a talking bear (116-17). In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader he treats vegetarianism as a highbrow fad. He describes Harold and Alberta, the parents of Eustace Clarence Scrubb, as “vegetarians, non-smokers, and teetotallers [who] wore a special kind of underclothes” (1). Although appreciative of George Bernard Shaw’s ability, Jack thought Shaw’s vegetarianism was silly. As an example he cited Shaw’s response to an invitation to be a house guest of Lady Londonderry, a society hostess. Shaw accepted, but pointed out that he did not “eat the bodies of dead and often putrefying animals and birds.” She replied, telegraphically, “Know nothing of your habits trust they are better than your manners” (W. H. Lewis 365).

Although Lewis had no scruples about eating animals, he firmly opposed vivisection. His 1948 antivivisection pamphlet, reprinted in God in the Dock, argues this way: we may assume (from the Bible) that human beings are superior to animals in the hierarchical order created by God. But does that give man the right to inflict pain on animals? If so, then by the same argument the angels would have the right to experiment on inferior human beings. Worse still, superior beings would have the right to experiment on inferior ones, as indeed “Nazi scientists have done.” On the contrary, says Lewis, the very fact that man is higher obligates him not to be a vivisector (224-28). Noblesse oblige.

But Lewis’s objection to vivisection was much deeper than the syllogistically-reasoned argument he made in the pamphlet. It was a conviction he had held from earliest times. For example, at age eleven he asked his father not to give him a microscope for Christmas because it would not be “nice” to kill otherwise harmless creatures just for his personal entertainment (W. H. Lewis 21). In contrast with the young Lewis, we note that Eustace Clarence Scrubb liked “animals, especially beetles, if they were dead and pinned on a card” (Dawn Treader 1). In the planetary trilogy, the cutting or torture of animals is the black hat that marks villains: Weston’s experimentation on the guard dog in Silent Planet, the Urnan’s compulsive splitting of the aerial frogs in Perelandra, the “immense programme of vivisection” of the N.I.C.E. in That Hideous Strength. And it is significant that in his crisis of faith recorded in A Grief Observed Lewis accuses God of being a cruel vivisectonist (26).

Lewis especially hated animal experimentation for trivial reasons. Although he made fun of George Bernard Shaw’s vegetarianism, he praised him for his attack on vivisection in the preface to his play, “The Doctor’s Dilemma,” especially for Shaw’s scorn of silly, useless experiments (W. H. Lewis 335). Thus in That Hideous Strength Lewis sarcastically notes that Mark Studdock was impressed by the “thousands of pounds’ worth of living animality, which the Institute could afford to cut up like paper on the mere chance of some interesting discovery” (102). Necessary as animal experimentation sometimes seems, we have to ask: How many animals die because some undergraduate is replicating a standard experiment? Or because some middle school teacher wants to enliven a science class? And should students of Veterinary Medicine at Colorado State University perform organ transplants on healthy dogs to practice their surgical skills? (Of course, my pets benefit from the skill our veterinarian developed in this way.) Also, Lewis never dealt with the fact that reduction of animal experimentation increases the amount of human experimentation, especially on minorities and convicts.

In the “Vivisection” pamphlet Lewis describes the very narrow circumstances in which he would consider experimentation acceptable: doing it “with scrupulous care to avoid the least dram or scruple of unnecessary pain, in a trembling awe at the responsibility which [the scientist] assumes, and with a vivid sense of the high mode of which human life must be lived if it is to justify the sacrifices made for it” (God in the Dock 226). I wonder if the same criteria could be applied to the way one eats animals. Certainly my conscience is troubled when I think of the concentration camp atmosphere of the feed lots outside Greeley, my home town, where cattle await slaughter. Then there are the tiny cages in which chicken meat is produced — the creatures are so debirdized that you can’t really call them chickens — and for all meat animals there’s the torture of being trucked across country, not to mention the brutal but economical methods of killing. Of course, more humane methods of obtaining meat would add a great deal to the cost, but we have to ask how many people really need all-you-can-eat buffets or the seventy-two ounce Texas steak which our inexpensive meat supply enables us to have. Indeed, questions about the use of animals as pigs are very complex. Lewis did not resolve them, and neither can I.

So let us move now to animals as teddy bears, as furry objects for our love which we use as symbols. As human
beings, we repeatedly observe animal behavior and interpret it in terms of human personality traits — that is, we use animals as symbols. For example, in Perelandra the eldil describes to Ransom the “delicate and glorious” singing beast, who is suckled by a mute female of another species. And she says, “[F]rom the habits of these two beasts much wisdom will come into the minds of my King and my Queen...” (196). What Tor and Tinidril would learn is how to nurture their own children without trying to dictate their destinies. Surely much wisdom, especially folk wisdom, has come to us from observation of the beasts and is expressed in symbol and metaphor.

My original plan was to center this section on the Chronicles of Narnia, to speak glowingly about Lewis’s purpose of using his stories, Spenser-like, to train young people emotionally, and then to conclude with a vindication of fantasy as opposed to cold scientific knowledge about animals. But it hasn’t worked out that way.

First, as I went over the Chronicles, I found, much to my surprise, that these sagas from the world of talking beasts don’t always focus on animals. The first book, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe (and it is the first of the Chronicles of Narnia, despite the mishmash of the new edition), gives us a glorious clutter of beings from different mythologies: from classical literature, the half-human, non-talking animals. The robin who leads the children to Bacchus in rallying the non-talking animals and the personified forces of trees and water. A major theme of the second book is the healing of the kind of alienation symbolized as teddy bears, it is important to treat them as symbols regain importance in The Last Battle, in which Lewis again makes good artistic use of their traditional symbolic qualities. Shift the Ape, or simian, was used in medieval literature to exemplify hypocrisy or unintelligent imitation. Shift does this when he dresses Puzzle the stupid donkey in a lion skin as an imitation Aslan. The talking horses are spirited and noble; the dogs are loyal and eager; the lamb has the gentle outspokenness of the meek who inherit the earth. These animals function symbolically; we see human nature mirrored in them.

Whether animals are treated as pets, used as pigs, or symbolized as teddy bears, it is important to treat them with knowledge and discretion. In The Magician’s Nephew the naive, recently-created talking animals are fascinated by Uncle Andrew, but he finds being their pet very uncomfortable indeed. They made a cage for him and then tried to feed him. The donkey threw him thistles; “The Squirrels bombarded him with volleys of nuts”; the birds dropped worms on him, and the bear threw him a honeycomb in which not all the bees were gone. When the honeycomb hit his face, Uncle Andrew staggered backward and sat down. “And it was sheer bad luck that he sat down on the pile of thistles” (169).

In America we sometimes abuse animals out of innocent ignorance, but more often because of projecting our feelings and motivations upon them. We are particularly likely to do this because we are so much influenced by our media’s cartoonizing of animals — in films, in ads, in children’s stories. Often this humanizing is harmless, imaginative play, but at other times it leads well-meaning people into treating animals inappropriately. For example, in Greeley about three years ago a shopping center was to be built on the site of a prairie dog town. At first the plan was
to drop poison capsules down the burrows to get rid of the prairie dogs, but there was an outcry from people who saw the animals as cute, Disney-like figures. So the City Council gave these people a deadline for implementing a prairie dog rescue. At first the humanitarians set cage-type traps for the prairie dogs, but someone (possibly a child who felt sorry for them) opened the doors and released them. Then the rescuers tried to flood the burrows and catch the prairie dogs as they came out. Finally they decided to use a powerful vacuum to suck the animals out of their holes and put them in cages to be moved. One of my colleagues worked on this project for three weekends. She received several bites, even through her heavy leather gloves, but fortunately didn’t develop an infection. And what did all this accomplish? Those prairie dogs who were caught were moved to open spaces in Wyoming and at Rocky Flats, where they would become dinner for eagles.

To be sensible, our treatment of animals must be placed in a larger context. Our relationship to all animals — whether as pets, pigs, or teddy bears — depends on maintaining an environment in which both animals and human beings can live. Lewis’s handling of this problem in the planetary trilogy was simplistic and, in That Hideous Strength, even somewhat hysterical. However, some of his post-World War II writings show a deep understanding and concern with it. He became more and more aware of the role of overpopulation.

It is obvious that the more people there are, the greater loss of habitat for animals and plants, a fact that Lewis, with his love for nature, understood well. As he wrote to an American woman in 1956, “how lovely to live in a country that still has beavers! We lost ours about 700 years ago” (Wade Coll. CSL to Mrs. Johnson 3 Dec. 1956). In a 1959 letter Lewis says the fear of overpopulation is a “rational” one, adding “We shall fairly soon overpopulate this planet and that population will be as defective in quality as excessive in quantity” (Wade Coll., CSL to Daniel Tucker, Dec. 8, 1959).

On the surface this sounds offensively elitist, but we need to consider that one of effects of postwar socialism was a degradation of the environment for animals. Large estates, where the gentry’s love of hunting ensured the maintenance of open country, were generally broken up and used for suburban tract houses. Distributed this way, the land could support a larger human population; it was arguably more just; but it did result in the displacement of animals and the loss of some joy and comfort for human beings. As Warnie explains, Jack did not mourn “for vanished class privilege and financial security,” but “he did sigh for... the last simple pleasures open to every countryman... — the empty sky, the unspoilt hills of Down, and its white, silent roads on which you could hear the rattle of a farm cart half a mile away” (10). Jack’s essential justice and detachment from his own interests are seen in his description of a holiday in Ireland. He regretted its loss of solitude and its growing emphasis on tourism, and commenting wryly that a person naturally disapproves of “all holiday makers except oneself!” (W. H. Lewis 406).

Elitist or not, the problem of overpopulation is what it is. Many people believe that technological solutions will enable the planet to support higher and higher human populations, but I am very skeptical of the efficacy of technical knowledge without wisdom. At the first Mythopoeic Conference I ever attended, I was charmed to note a time scheduled on the program — I believe it was at two a.m. — for “the sale of college lands.” As you all know, this refers to the episode in That Hideous Strength in which the scholars of Bracton College are maneuvered into giving up the land around Merlin’s Well — giving up their heritage, their environment, their soul. Here in the West, and indeed all over the United States, we are undergoing a similar debate. In Lewis’s novel, the reasons for the sale were money and power. If the land were not sold, the junior fellows would not receive a much-needed increase in salary, and the N.I.C.E. might go to Cambridge instead of Edgestow. Today we are told that the sale of our federal lands — their water rights, mineral rights, grazing rights, logging rights and tourist-trap development rights — is necessary to provide employment. As Lewis once noted, “unemployment” is simply a euphemism for overpopulation. (World’s Last Night 79). If such sales are not held at two a.m., at least they are held in times and places unknown to the general public but known to lobbyists and special interests.

But even without downright greed, it takes more than pity for prairie dogs to fulfill our duty to the environment. In medieval terms, we need both sapientia — wisdom — and scientia — technology. Lewis expresses the importance of wisdom in The Abolition of Man when he says, “For the wise men of old the cardinal problem had been how to conform the soul to reality, and the solution had been knowledge, self-discipline, and virtue” (88). But then he goes on to describe technology as a process of “subdu[ing] reality to the wishes of men.” Technology unguided by wisdom is irresponsible, but I am equally skeptical of the efficacy of wisdom without knowledge. In fact, if we are to establish a peaceful relationship between ourselves and the animals, all sharing, then technology must be combined with the ancient wisdom.

A case in point is the fur coats that hang in the wardrobe, the magic entrance to Narnia. After The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe was published Mrs. Barfield wrote to Lewis complaining about this use of fur and sending him information on the cruelty to animals involved in obtaining fur. Lewis offered to change this passage, although he never quite got around to it (Glover 35). Because of animal rights activism, many people today are aware of this cruelty and now refuse to wear fur. But it is technology that gives us fake fur like that which decorates my costume. Similarly, it is technology which enables some medical
students today to learn anatomy by computer, thus lessening the need for vivisection.

Lewis' treatment of animals in his fiction arouses Sehnsucht in us. His books can also awaken our sense of responsibility, sharpen our sensory appreciation of the beauty of creation, and heighten our desire to improve life for animals. We read them, not just for escape, but for transcendence, for a different view of the universe we live in. But we also need the biological knowledge to take practical steps. For all his inadequacies and occasional blind spots, Lewis has given us much to admire and emulate. He did not cease to ponder the meaning of Nature, and find in it a source of wisdom. Now it is our turn.

Notes
1. Quotations from W. H. Lewis' writing in C. S. Lewis: A Biography are used by permission of the Wade Center.
2. The poem is called "To —.
3. Extracts from C. S. Lewis' letters reproduced by permission of Curtis Brown, London on behalf of C. S. Lewis Pte. Ltd. I am grateful to the Wade Center for providing access to these letters.
4. See Myers 94-95 for a refutation of the idea that Lewis embraced the cruelty to animals inherent in Cartesianism.

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