Law and Disorder: Two Settings in *That Hideous Strength*

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**Abstract**
Contrasts Bracton College, symbolic of failure to respect the natural law (or Tao), as Lewis defines it, and Belbury. The former ignores the natural law, representing alienation from nature and “licit” law, religion, and science.

**Additional Keywords**
Law in *That Hideous Strength*; Lewis, C.S. *The Abolition of Man*; Lewis, C.S. *That Hideous Strength*—Settings; Natural law in *That Hideous Strength*
The contrast between St. Anne's and Belbury is an obvious structural principle in That Hideous Strength. The narration alternates between the adventures of Jane at St. Anne's and those of Mark at Belbury, and the settings are so vivid that they almost become characters. The buildings and grounds of St. Anne's are a kind of Eden, a place where people live in harmony with each other, with animals, and with supernatural beings. The buildings and grounds of Belbury are a second Babel, where people live in fearful confusion, trapped between animals intended for vivisection and the evil spirit that speaks through the Head. But there is a third place in the story, Bracton College, and Lewis' treatment of it adds depth and subtlety to what otherwise could have been a completely simplistic conflict between good and evil. It is Bracton College rather than St. Anne's that is, or should be, the true opposite of Belbury's hideous strength. It is because Bracton College has failed that Belbury threatens to take over England; and it is because the Fellows of Bracton have lost the good of the intellect that Merlin must be sent from St. Anne's as a magus ex machina to do their work of stopping Belbury.

As Lewis says in the preface to That Hideous Strength "This [story]...has behind it a serious 'point' which I have tried to make in my Abolition of Man." To a great extent, that 'point' is the loss of integrity in the intellectual life of England, and indeed the civilized world; and to a hitherto- unnoticed extent, the point is expressed by the contrast between the buildings and grounds of Bracton College and those of Belbury. Belbury is a place where man is abolished; Bracton College should be, but is not, a place where man is nurtured and restored.

The description of the College's physical layout at first seems to be mere local color, but it embodies a lost standard of education, of intellectual order, of moral excellence. The description of Belbury, which doesn't intrude upon one's consciousness until Mark's first rebellion against the N.I.C.E. causes him to seek refuge outside the building, immediately seems more significant, but this significance of descriptive detail becomes even clearer in contrast with Bracton College. Before considering the physical layout of the College, however, it is necessary to contemplate its name and purpose, set forth with academic precision by the authorial voice:

It was founded in 1300 for the support of ten learned men whose duties were to pray for the soul of Henry de Bracton and to study the laws of England. The number of Fellows has gradually increased to forty, of whom only six (apart from the Bacon Professor) now study Law and of whom none, perhaps, prays for the soul of Bracton (THS 17).

Henry de Bracton, for whom the college was named, died in 1268, so that the foundation date is historically plausible. He was the prime jurist of medieval England and the author of De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England). The fact that the original purpose of Bracton College was to study law makes sense when we remember that The Abolition of Man, which Lewis specifically invites us to consider as the non-fiction background of THS, is about the Tao — that is, the Law of Nature.

In De legibus Bracton assumes the existence of the Law of Nature, and, in fact, Lewis' discussion of the Tao harmonizes in several points with Bracton's fundamental assumptions. First, Bracton defines justice as "a willed good," because an action "cannot properly be called good unless will plays a part" (De legibus 23). In Abolition Lewis emphasizes the heart, the seat of the will. He says, "We were told it all long ago by Plato: '...The head rules the belly through the chest....'" (AM 34). He objects to the kind of education purveyed in "The Green Book" primarily because it tends to break down the will, thus laying open the human personality to the operations of the Conditioners.

Second, Lewis defines the Tao as "Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason" (AM 56), a combination of Bracton's jus naturale, or natural law, and jus gentium, the law of nations. Lewis' Tao is identifiable with Bracton's jus naturale, which Bracton defines as "natural instinct" and "that [which is] taught all living things by nature" (De legibus 26) because Lewis says that the Tao serves mankind the way instinct serves other animals (AM 90). Lewis' Tao is also identifiable with Bracton's jus gentium the law of nations, which Bracton describes as including piety toward God, the right of self-defense, and obedience to parents and the patria (27). In the Appendix to Abolition, Lewis lists all the examples specified by Bracton except piety toward God.

The relationship between the points made in Abolition and the corresponding discussion in De legibus shows that Lewis defines the law much more broadly than we are used to doing. In describing Mark's college as a place where the intellectuals have ceased to study the Law, Lewis is saying that they have lost touch with the Tao, with the nature of the universe and man's place in it.

Lewis' reverence for law and for Henry de Bracton
apparently owes something to his association with both Owen Barfield and Charles Williams, though it is at this point impossible to determine exactly who influenced whom. Barfield was a lawyer as well as a philologist, and Lewis' whole discussion of the Tao in Abolition seems to be shaped by a submerged comparison of the Tao with the nature of language as set forth in Barfield's Poetic Diction (1928). Barfield argues that language is in essence metaphorical, that human beings are able to use language because they perceive the parallelism between the material universe and its spiritual meaning. This parallelism is a given; it is the way the human mind works. Lewis' Tao, like language, is the human mind's basis of operation. Just as we cannot step outside metaphor when using language, we have "no power of inventing a new [ethical] value" (AM 55-57). Like language, the Natural Law dwells within the human mind, but interaction with one's community is necessary to make it operative.

Barfield states the relationship between language, the Tao and the legal system more clearly in his essay, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction. In it he discusses the legal fiction — such as the one by which a corporation is deemed to be a person — as a kind of metaphor. Like a metaphor, a legal fiction expands human consciousness by expanding the applicability of the law. Metaphor, says Barfield, is "no legal fiction as language is to law, and as meaning is to the social life of the community: "the nature of law, as law, is the same, whether it be moral, or logical, or municipal" (Rediscovery 58, 64).

Barfield asserts the overwhelming importance of law as the basis of knowledge and virtue when he quotes F.W. Maitland's famous description of law as "the point where life and logic meet" in his preface to the 1952 edition of Poetic Diction. The phrase "life and logic" implies medieval education's two kinds of knowledge — the trivium, which taught language structures (grammar, logic and rhetoric), and the quadrivium, which taught the structures and meanings of material things (life). But the scientists of Bracton, except Hingest, no longer study the laws of the universe, and the humanists, except Jewel, no longer study the laws of language.

Charles Williams also expresses great reverence for Law in this broader sense. Lewis may have received the idea of naming Mark's college after Bracton from Williams' 1931 novel, Many Dimensions. The principal male character is Lord Arglay, the Chief Justice, to whom Williams gives this flaming translation of a passage from Bracton: "Therefore let the king attribute to the law that which the law attributes to him, namely, domination and power. For where the will rules and not the law is no king" (214). One of the most obvious contrasts between St. Anne's and Belbury in THS is that Ransom, the Pendragon, is a king attributing domination and power to the law, while Withy, the Deputy Director, rules by whim and intimidation.

The famous college meeting shows that the Fellows have replaced both law and logic with petty political maneuvering. Since they no longer study the law, they no longer debate logically; pursuing power for its own sake, they violate the absolutes of the Tao. The point is sharpened at the dinner after the meeting, in which Curry says he would like to do research but is too busy maintaining Bracton's status as an institution of learning. Ironically, Curry's field is military history. Although De legibus deals only with English, not international law, a Bractonian approach to military history would have been of vital significance to Curry's patr"a which had experienced two major wars in twenty-five years.

All this richness of allusion is presented in the guise of background information about the setting of "a 'tall story' about devilry." The fact that "only six (apart from the Bacon Professor) now study Law" is a judgment on modern society as a whole, in which, as Barfield says, the former "respectful attitude to legal studies has long since been abandoned" (Rediscovery 63). Even the author's fussy academic parenthesis "apart from the Bacon Professor" is significant; as Barfield reminds us, Bacon, a lawyer as well as the founder of the scientific method, formulated the scientist's concept of "the laws of nature" by analogy with jurisprudence (61-62).

In their neglect of their patron's legal studies, the Fellows of Bracton College have also forgotten the relationship, set forth by Lewis in Abolition, between feeling and the law. This too is disguised as a mere philological comment about sounds. "Bracton" has voiceless stops, [k] and [t]; "Bragdon," the name of the wood containing Merlin's Well, is the same except that the stops are voiced — [g] and [d]. The narrator says, "How Bragdon the wood was connected with Bracton the lawyer was a mystery, but I fancy myself that the Bracton family had availed themselves of an accidental similarity in the names" (THS 21). But as Ransom found out on Perelandra, in Lewis' universe there are no accidents. The connection may be a mystery to the narrator, but it is not insignificant: it is a disguised reference to feeling, "the ordinate condition of the affections" (AM 26), which is a necessary component in the ability to live out the Tao.

With this background on the broader meaning of Law and the implications of Bracton Fellows' failure to study it, the descriptive details concerning the buildings and grounds can be usefully examined. Nancy-Lou Patterson has already carefully traced the literary and historical allusions in the description of the College and the Wood. Her information, although collected to support a Jungian interpretation of the novel, including a symbolic opposition between thought and feeling, also fits the present study of the legal motif. Bragdon Wood is, as Patterson points out, an enclosed garden, and, as such, an ancient symbol of Paradise. The only way to get into it is through the College quadrangles, "a series of widenings and narrowings" (Patterson 7). Each one of the quadrangles represents a different relationship to the natural law as
understood by Henry de Bracton.

The Newton quadrangle, “dry and gravelly” (THS 20), represents a time when “the activities of the scientist were subject to moral and religious commandments.” A Christian as well as a pioneer of modern science, Newton valued his own work on theology and biblical chronology as much as his discoveries in physics and mathematics. He discovered that the same law governs the fall of an apple and the swing of the planets in their courses, thus providing evidence that the universe is truly a uni-verse, a rational whole that can be understood by reason. Pope captured the 18th century intellectuals’ excited reaction to Newton in his “Epitaph Intended for Sir Isaac Newton”:

Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night;
God said, Let Newton be! and all was light.

But the Fellows at Bracton College, except Hingest, no longer study the laws of Nature.

The Republic quadrangle represents still another kind of licit, rational thought: This, the authorial voice explains, is the original college. The Chapel is not far off, and there is “the hoarse, heavy noise” of a large medieval clock. Its name refers to Plato’s Republic (Patterson 9), the source of the educational philosophy set forth in The Abolition of Man. In fact, Plato’s philosophy provided the basis for the medieval synthesis of all knowledge in a Christian framework. His philosophy is in some sense the center of the Tao that the Bractonians should study, just as the Republic is the central quadrangle. In The Discarded Image published in 1962 but based on lectures given much earlier, Lewis describes the medieval synthesis as combining “splendour, sobriety, and coherence” (216). Thus the grass in the Republic cloister is very green and the stone “soft and alive” in contrast to the dry and gravelly Newton quadrangle.

Onto the other side of the Republic is licit piety, symbolized by the Lady Alice quadrangle. The authorial voice describes it as a “sweet Protestant world” of “humble, almost domestic” buildings (THS 20). The passage between the Newton and Republic quadrangles opens into the Hall, a place for civilized dining and conversation, on the left, and the buttery, a service area for the Hall, on the right. The passage between Republic and Lady Alice quadrangles is decorated with “slabs and urns and busts that commemorate dead Bractonians” (THS 20), a veiled reminder of another aspect of the Tao: the duty to honor the dead. Between the Lady Alice quadrangle and Bradgon Wood is the Fellows’ bowling green, which suggests recreation and the balance of body and mind.10 The gate to Bradgon Wood is an Inigo Jones, another instance of sense and balance. All of these details point to the present Bracton Fellows’ failure to study the law.

The same is true of the narrator’s excursus into the history of the Merlin’s Well. During Queen Elizabeth’s reign — the time of the Elizabethan Compromise in religion — the warden of Bracton College surrounded the Well with a wall. His action — preserving the relic but preventing its misuse — is the response of a true student of the Law to the changed conditions of the time. In contrast, Cromwell’s men attempted to destroy it, occasioning the martyrdom of “the fabulously learned and saintly Richard Crow” (THS 22), forerunner of the learned and aristocratic William Hingest and an exemplar of noble adherence to the Tao. His last words to the Cromwellians uphold the laws and customs of England:

Marry, Sirs, if Merlin who was the Devil’s son was a true King’s man as ever ate bread, is it not a shame that you, being but the sons of bitches, must be rebels and regicides? (THS 22).

As the narrator lies by Merlin’s Well, he thinks of others who have lain there, and who, as best they could, followed the Tao in their times: Sir Kenelm Digby (1603-1665), an amateur scientist, poet, and collector of manuscripts; William Collins (1721-1759), a pre-Romantic poet; George III, the mad king, and Nathaniel Fox, a fictional World War I poet.11 Thus is summarized the tradition and quality of thought which the present Bractonians, especially the Progressive Element, reject — from the sacredness of Merlin’s burial place (which they are willing to sell) to the ardent patriotism of the young poet who believed that it is dulce et decorum to die for England. The law they do not study is the Tao itself.

This understanding of the description of Bracton College sharpens the significance of the even more compact description of Belbury. The authorial voice describes Belbury as “a florid Edwardian mansion which had been built for a millionaire who admired Versailles” and which “at the sides, . . . [had] sprouted into a widespread outgrowth of newer cement buildings, which housed the Blood Transfusion office” (THS 51). With that hint, the narrator plunges Mark into the stressful interview with Wither and delays his description of the grounds until Mark, ostracized because of his initial refusal to write propaganda, is forced to go out for a walk. The unfriendly environment reflects his misery:

The Edwardian millionaire who had built Belbury had enclosed about twenty acres with a low brick wall surmounted by an iron railing, and laid it all out in what his contractor called Ornamental Pleasure Grounds. There were trees dotted about and winding paths covered so thickly with round white pebbles that you could hardly walk on them. There were immense flower beds, some oblong, some lozenge-shaped, and some crescents. There were plantations — slabs would be almost a better word — of that kind of laurel which looks as if it were made of cleverly painted and varnished metal. Massive summer seats of bright green stood at regular intervals along the paths. The whole effect was like that of a municipal cemetery (THS 101).

These repellent details symbolize the opposite of Bracton’s respect for the laws and customs of England, the opposite of the Tao.

The fact that Belbury resembles Versailles is symbolic
Lewis, of course, knew all about Versailles from his brother Warren. Although W.H. Lewis’ brilliant and charming book, The Splendid Century: Life in the France of Louis XIV was not published until 1953, nearly ten years after the publication of this book, it was virtually finished in 1942, about the time C.S. Lewis was preparing the Riddell Memorial Lectures, later published as The Abolition of Man. Warren’s presentation of Louis XIV can be read as a wry background to his brother’s description of Belbury.

Louis XIV was the Sun King, the absolutely monarch. Not for him Bracton’s principle that the king’s “domination and power” is limited by Natural Law, or, as Lewis expresses it in The Horse and His Boy, “The King’s under the law, for it’s the law [that] makes him a king” (Chapter 15). Citing Louis XIV’s memoirs, W. H. Lewis shows the quality of the French king’s rule: “[Louis believed] he ought to trust rather to the inner light than to information which reach[es] him from outside” and thought of himself as “[e]xercising … the Divine functions here below ….” (The Splendid Century 28). Just as the Belbury edifice is a debased copy of Versailles, Belbury’s understanding of headship is a debased version of absolutism. The Head, Alcasan, is only an obscene lump of flesh; Jules, the Director, is only a figurehead; Wither, the Deputy Director, and in some sense the real ruler, inverts the governance of Louis XIV. His inner light is diabolical darkness, and it, rather than outside information, is the source of his decisions, for “he had long ceased to believe in knowledge itself” (THS 353). Concerning Louis XIV, W. H. Lewis comments, the subject [of an absolute ruler] has but two courses open to him: he may accept the king’s premise, or he may try to chop off his head. The one thing which he cannot do is to attempt to argue with him. . . . (Splendid 29).

Similarly, Wither is a person outside the law. Because “life and logic” do not meet in his governance — his administrative decisions — it is impossible to argue with him, as Mark finds to his chagrin. At Bracton College, though the Fellows have abandoned the Law, Curry is careful to orchestrate the debate so that they will vote as he wishes. At Belbury, Wither need not create even the pretense of debate. The abandonment of the Tao which has led to the corruption of politics at Bracton College has resulted in the complete absence of political behavior (one of the marks of humanity) at Belbury.

The resemblance of Belbury to Versailles is also an ironic reference to the locus of the Treaty of Versailles, one of the post-World War I agreements that “contributed significantly to the outbreak of a new and more terrible war.” Because the rulers of Europe had not been taught by the intellectuals of Europe how “life and logic” meet in the law, World War II was inevitable. Belbury thus provides a concrete image of the disorder to which the failure of the intellectuals, the “trahison des clercs” (THS 371) has contributed.

The contrast between the architecture of Belbury and that of Bracton College shows that this trahison stems from modern intellectuals’ ignorance of, or ignoring of, “Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes” (AM 56). The center of Bracton College’s architecture is [Plato’s] Republic quadrangle, with Newton quadrangle, representing the lawful science of the 17th century on one side and Lady Alice quadrangle, representing lawful 17th-century religion, on the other. The center of Belbury represents the dark side of the 17th century, and even that is defaced by the concrete modern buildings on each side. The “low brick wall surmounted by an iron railing” is a cheap Iron Age version of the hunting forest that visually delimited the garden of Versailles; it also contrasts graphically with the ancient wall that surrounds Merlin’s Well. The “trees dotted about” and the unwalkable paths contrast with Bragdon Wood, where trees grow “just so wide apart that one saw uninterrupted foliage in the distance but the place where one stood seemed always to be a clearing; surrounded by a world of shadows, one walked in mild sunshine” (THS 21). It is perhaps not overreading to see in the mixed sunshine and shadow of Bragdon Wood a parable of man walking according to the Tao and to see in the unwalkable paths of Belbury the abolition of human moral, esthetic, and intellectual endeavor.

Like its French original, the garden of Belbury expresses alienation from Nature. Louis XIV’s decisions regarding Versailles could be interpreted as alienation from nature. He gave orders for “rivers [to be] diverted and swamps . . . drained at enormous expense.” Saint-Simon expressed disgust at “the violences done to Nature” and commented: “It diverted him [Louis] to ride roughshod over nature and to use his money and ingenuity to subdue it to his will.” The Belburian desire for domination is expressed in the cutting of the plum trees in the Dimbles’ garden, the destruction of the woods around Merlin’s Well, and the plan to eliminate the village of Cure Hardy by changing the course of the stream — just as Louis XIV “commandeered” the old village of Versailles and destroyed its parish church (Walton 17). The reference to the laurel that is real but looks artificial foreshadows Mark’s conversation with Filostrato the biologist, who wants to replace live trees with aluminum ones and who dreams of fabricating clockwork birds that sing “when you press a switch” (THS 173).

The summative observation that the garden is like a municipal cemetery symbolizes the separation of matter from spirit that arose from Cartesian philosophy. Descartes’ philosophy was Platonic in that it affirmed the possibility of certain knowledge derived from innate ideas, but in practice Descartes knew that science is uncertain and its findings probabilistic. The result is an under-
mining of trust in the *Tao*. Indeed, Descartes asserted that since God has free will, he can make contradictions be true. This is far removed from the Deity that Lewis describes in *The Chronicles of Narnia*: a sun-king lion who obeys his own laws.

The garden of Versailles has been said to embody concepts of Cartesian philosophy because it expressed "the 'natural' in terms of the universal laws of geometry." Descartes himself is supposed to have wished that "the visible world . . . had more ordered shapes." The geometrically-shaped flower beds in Belbury's "municipal cemetery" do resemble those of Versailles, which some people also find esthetically dead. For example, Timothy Nourse, a 17th century aficionado of gardens, objected to "the 'dead plains' and little variety of Versailles" (*Genius* 100).

The overall impression of deadness symbolizes Cartesianism's greatest damage to the intellectual synthesis represented by Bracton College: the mechanization and desacralization of Nature. Denying the parallelism between the material universe and its spiritual meaning as set forth in Barfield's *Poetic Diction*, it promulgated the idea that animals are pure, soulless automatons and that human bodies are also machines, but with an "incorporeal soul" in the pineal gland. One of the Cartesians, Fr. Nicholas Malebranche, believing that animals are nothing more than machines, was seen to kick a pregnant dog. He also reprimanded Jean de la Fontaine for being sympathetic to animals and writing animal fables. Hightower quotes from Fontaine an account of how experimenters "systematically manipulated a living creature as if it were a senseless machine," beating dogs and nailing them to boards, then cutting them open to study their inner mechanisms while they were still alive. At Belbury the mechanistic approach to the universe culminates logically in the preservation of Alcansan's head and in Frost's goal of turning himself into a motiveless machine.

Just like its French original, the Belbury Versailles has a menagerie, but the animals are to be tortured in experiments rather than serving as a divertissement for a sinking courtiers. Despite the failure of the Bractonians to study the *Tao*, the animals of Bragdon Wood are mild, quiet sheep who perform a service by keeping the grass cropped. In contrast, the animals of Belbury are imprisoned in idleness, awaiting vivisection. They express their woe in "all manner of trumpetings, bayings, screams, laughter even, which shuddered and protested for a moment and then died away into mutterings and whines." Just as Versailles was an expression of absolutely power, Mark sees the Belbury zoo as an expression of the N.I.C.E.'s power: it could take expensive animals and "cut [them] up like paper on the mere chance of some interesting discovery" (*THS* 102).

The absence of lawful science and religion expressed by the building and grounds of Belbury acquires emotional color (or rather, colorlessness) from the fact that the reader experiences this absence through the consciousness of Mark, who is struggling to keep afloat in the new social system. In contrast with the narrator's description of Bracton College, Mark's observations are without historical resonances, firmly rooted in the present time. He is concerned with his physical and psychic comfort. He notes that his bedroom has a good fire and a private bathroom, that the mirror on the wide staircase reflects his gaucherie, that the long table in the dining room prevents him from starting a conversation with anyone. Belbury is a place which coddles the body while starving the spirit — a commune which is not a community. Mark's narrow concern with himself, his career, his survival graphically displays the poverty of modern man outside the *Tao*.

The three settings of That *Hideous Strength* — Bracton College, St. Anne's, and Belbury — parallel and contrast with each other, presenting a kind of diagram of modern society and its relation to the *Tao*. Although the contrast between St. Anne's and Belbury expresses much of the opposition between good and evil, the contrast between Belbury and the tradition embodied in Bracton College expresses the opposition between man as a political being and man as a machine; between harmony with Nature and alienation from it; between an unspiritual science and a science governed by the *Tao*. In the conclusion to *Abolition of Man* Lewis calls, hesitantly and tentatively, for an intellectual community based on the study of Law:

I hardly know what I am asking for. I hear rumours that Goethe's approach to nature deserves fuller consideration — that even Dr. Steiner may have seen something that orthodox researchers have missed. The regenerate science which I have in mind would not do even to minerals and vegetables what modern science threatens to do to man himself (*AM* 89-90).

It is one of the great weaknesses of That *Hideous Strength* that it does not provide a clear picture of a licit intellectual community. Hingest, the good scientist, and Jewel, the good classicist, have lost the synthesis represented by the three quadrangles of Bracton College. The intellectuals in the Company of St. Anne's are in hiding, isolated from scholarly discourse. The sending of Merlin, the magician-scientist from the past, to destroy Belbury provides an exciting, dramatic conclusion to an adventure story, but it contains no suggestion about how modern man is to overcome alienation, amorality, and ambiguity — chestlessness — and get back to the study of the Law. The reunion of Mark and Jane, seen by Mrs. Dimble as "Spirit and matter, certainly" (*THS* 284), does not actually take place in the book. On the other hand, as it stands, That *Hideous Strength* is a powerful image of the Wasteland of the 20th century.

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**Endnotes**


3. Lewis expresses his understanding of, and agreement with, Barfield's theory in "Bluspels and Flarskiers," in which he speaks of the psycho-physical parallelism ... in the universe ... (In Selected Essays, ed. Walter Hooper. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969, 265.)

4. "Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction" was not published until 1947 (in Essays Presented to Charles Williams, edited by Lewis, too late to be claimed as a direct influence on Abolition and THS. Nevertheless, it is likely that Barfield and Lewis influenced each other through private discussion, and it is possible that Lewis' submerged comparison of language and Law in Abolition helped to suggest the essay topic to Barfield.

5. There is an interesting parallel to Barfield's thought in this passage of Williams' Many Dimensions:

"[Lord Arglay] defined law provisionally as 'the formal expression of increasing communal self-knowledge' and had an excursus comparing the variations in law with the variations in poetic diction from age to age, the aim being to discover the best plastic medium for expression in action" (152). This sounds like Barfield's assertion about developing consciousness of mankind and the relationship between knowledge and metaphor. One cannot help wondering whether Williams had read Poetic Diction, which was published in 1928, three years before the publication of Many Dimensions, or whether he got the idea from a third source. In any case, there is a certain artistic symmetry in the fact that Barfield's essay comparing "variations in law with the variations in poetic diction" was first published in Charles Williams memorial volume, Essays Presented to Charles Williams.  

6. Again, I feel certain that Lewis and Barfield had discussed "life, logic, and the law" before this relatively late publication.

7. The importance of this concept to Lewis is manifested by his use of it in The Horse and His Boy. Cf. infra.


10. Patterson traces the history of bowling to at least the 13th century and concludes, "This bowling green ... is England" (11).

11. See Patterson, 17-18. She suggests that Nathaniel Fox is a substitute for Rupert Brooke.


13. Clyde S. Kilby and Marjorie Lamp Mean, "Chronology," Brothers and Friends: The Diaries of Major Warren Hamilton Lewis (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982) xx. Even earlier, in 1934, W.H. Lewis refers to this "doggerel history of the reign of Louis XIV" (Brothers 147), which he was writing just for the fun of it.


19. Quoted by Sanche de Gramond in Epithaph for Kings, 46. I have been unable to locate the original quotation.

20. See James Highwater, Myth and Sexuality (New York: New American Library, 1990) 152-53, for a discussion of this point. Highwater seems to suggest that a visit to Versailles suggested this theory to Descartes, but Descartes's dates are 1596-1650, and the plans for Versailles were drawn up in 1668. Watson reminds us that walking, talking statues were well known in the 17th century. He remarks that "advancement in mechanical arts and crafts provided the practical foundation of Cartesian mechanism" (Encyclopaedia Britannica).